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Introduction
Prominent in the debate on how to fight global warming is the notion that badly designed climate policy is counter-productive. An example of this is the Green Paradox, which states that politicians that put off carbon taxation bring oil consumption forward and thus accelerate global warming (Sinn, 2008) . However, if fossil fuel extraction costs rise as reserves diminish, a future carbon tax might also cut the total amount of fossil fuel that is burnt and thus cut cumulative fossil fuel emissions (e.g., van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012) . Physicists have also recognized the importance of locking up enough fossil fuel in the crust of the earth (e.g., Allen et al., 2009) . Indeed, as much as third of oil, half of gas and over four fifths of coal reserves may need to be left unburnt for global warming to not exceed 2 degrees Celsius (McGlade and Ekins, 2015) . Much of this debate is cast in terms of a partial equilibrium framework. Our objective is to adopt a global general equilibrium perspective taking full account of the repercussions in global markets for final goods, bonds and fossil fuel. To get a grip on the vexing issue of the cumulative amount of fossil fuel to be burnt, we model exploration investment (Gaudet and Laserre, 1988; Cairns, 1990) , so cumulative fossil fuel use and carbon emissions depend on carbon taxation.
Our aim is to deepen the understanding of unilateral, second-best carbon taxes in general equilibrium where we distinguish oil-importing and oil-exporting countries with homothetic, symmetric preferences. With second best we mean that, on the one hand, politicians wish to postpone carbon taxation, and, on the other hand, carbon taxation has to be conducted knowing that other countries including fossil fuel producers are not willing to price carbon at the appropriate level. We are also interested in the welfare impacts of such second-best and unilateral policies and how such policies should be optimally set.
Our contributions are as follows.
First, we show that a future carbon tax leads to a bigger increase in current oil demand and carbon emissions if the price elasticities of current and future oil demand are large and the price elasticity of oil exploration and oil supply is small. We also show that this weak Green Paradox effect is attenuated by the fall in the world interest rate, especially if intertemporal substitution is weak (cf., van der Meijden et al., 2015) . The adverse effect on green welfare is further mitigated by locking more carbon in the earth as a result of curbing oil exploration. The net effect on green welfare is negative if the ecological discount rate is large enough while the price elasticity of oil demand is high and that of oil supply is small. Even if such a strong Green Paradox occurs (Gerlagh, 2011) , welfare of oil-importing countries can improve due to the import tariff and intertemporal terms of trade benefits of a higher anticipated carbon tax.
Second, we show that with a strong Green Paradox an asset holding tax on oil producers can be a viable policy alternative. But, if oil supply reacts strongly to oil prices and oil demand does not, postponed carbon taxation is productive and an asset holding tax is not.
Third, we show that weak Green Paradox effects arise if renewable energy is subsidized provided that it is a good enough substitute for oil. Also, if there is an abundant and cheap alternative fossil fuel (i.e., coal), we give the conditions under which the weak Green Paradox effect is reversed (cf., Michielsen, 2014) and the oil barons benefit from climate policy at the expense of coal producers (cf., Coulomb and Henriet, 2015) .
Fourth, we use our general equilibrium framework to establish that introducing a carbon tax that grows at a rate equal to the rate of interest is neutral if oil reserves are given.
Carbon taxes that rise faster than the rate of interest induce Green Paradox effects and are detrimental to green welfare whilst carbon taxes that rise slower than that improve green welfare. But if oil supply is elastic, a carbon tax that rises at a rate equal to the interest rate curbs oil extraction as well as exploration investment, cumulative oil extraction and cumulative carbon emissions, and thus boosts green welfare.
Fifth, we show that, if for political reasons the current carbon tax is set below the Pigouvian tax, the second-best optimal future carbon taxes are set below the first-best globally optimal carbon taxes to mitigate Green Paradox effects, and more so if the price elasticity of oil demand is relatively large compared with that of oil supply (possibly turning the future tax into a subsidy). The first-best global carbon taxes equal the Pigouvian taxes (the present value of marginal global warming damages), which rise slower than the rate of interest and thus induce no Green Paradox effects.
Sixth, we show that if carbon taxes are set unilaterally by the oil-importing countries, they exceed the first-best taxes as they contain an import tariff component. We also establish that the intertemporal terms of trade effects of a future carbon tax increase both the current and future import tariff components and that of the current carbon tax depresses the current import tariff component. We also discuss the time inconsistency of these unilateral second-best optimal carbon taxes that result from the pure rents inherent in future reserves and show that reneging implies that carbon taxes are set even higher, at an even greater welfare cost to oil-exporting countries.
Finally, carbon leakage (e.g., Elliott et al., 2010; Elliot et al., 2012; Fischer and Salant, 2013; Elliott and Fullerton, 2014; Pethig, 2011, 2013; Richter and Schopf, 2014; Sen, 2015) strengthens the Green Paradox as non-participating countries that do not price carbon raise their current (and also future) carbon emissions in response to a future unilateral carbon tax. We show that green welfare improves if oil supply responds more to prices than current oil demand, but welfare of countries that do price carbon rises by more.
We also derive the globally altruistic and the unilateral second-best optimal carbon taxes.
Our contribution owes a lot to the analysis of Eicher and Pethig (2011) , who offer a general equilibrium analysis of the Green Paradox and carbon leakage within the context of a 2-period, 3-country world with zero extraction costs and fixed oil reserves. Ritter and Schopf (2014) extend this general equilibrium analysis to allow for stock-dependent extraction costs. Van der Meijden et al. (2015) focus on two countries and extend the analysis to allow for endogenous oil reserves, investment in physical capital and asymmetric preferences between oil importers and oil exporters. They give examples with CES production functions for which the Green Paradox can be attenuated or reinforced rather than attenuated in general equilibrium. With identical preferences and no investment in physical capital, a future carbon tax unambiguously reduces the interest rate and attenuates the Green Paradox. Our innovation over these three studies is to use duality theory and offer, to the best of our knowledge for the first time, a comprehensive clear-cut welfare analysis of the Green Paradox and carbon leakage and easy-to-interpret formulae for the global first-best and global and unilateral second-best carbon taxes in a general equilibrium setting with an endogenous amount of cumulative extraction. To keep matters tractable, we suppose identical preferences (i.e., identical rates of time preference and coefficients of intergenerational inequality aversion) 1 .
Our contribution is thus to offer a general equilibrium public finance perspective on the Green Paradox and carbon leakage. It therefore focuses at the role of the price elasticities of demand and supply and the ecological discount rate to assess the welfare effects and second-best and unilateral carbon taxes and how these are impacted by the Green Paradox and carbon leakage. For example, starting with a two-country framework, we show that a future carbon tax worsens welfare if the supply of fossil fuel is relatively inelastic compared with the fossil fuel demand and the ecological discount rate is large enough.
More generally, duality allows us to quickly and conveniently establish the general equilibrium welfare effects of first-best, second-best optimal and unilateral carbon taxes.
Section 2 sets up the two-period, two-country model of global goods, capital and oil markets. Section 3 solves for the general equilibrium effects on oil prices and the world interest rate of present and future carbon taxes. Section 4 revisits the Green Paradox by discussing the general equilibrium effects of both a future carbon tax and a renewable energy subsidy on oil extraction, carbon emissions and welfare. Section 4 also discusses the merits of an asset holding subsidy and the Grey Paradox. Section 5 analyses the effects of introducing a balanced hike in carbon taxes on oil extraction, oil exploration and welfare. Section 6 discusses the effects of carbon taxes on the private and green components of welfare and then derives the first-best global and second-best unilateral carbon taxes. Section 7 shows that the optimal second-best, unilateral carbon taxes are excessive due an import tariff component to clobber the oil-producing countries and shows that the intertemporal terms of trade effect tends to tilt the import tariff component from the present to the future. It also shows that these second-best carbon taxes are time inconsistent. Section 8 extends the analysis to allow for three countries and carbon leakage and gives the globally altruistic and the unilateral second-best optimal carbon taxes when other countries that import fossil fuel do not price carbon. Section 9 concludes.
A Two-Period, Two-Country Model of Goods, Capital and Oil Markets 2
We extend the two-period, two-country model of international trade in oil, final goods and bonds used in Dixit (1981) , Marion and Svensson (1984) and van Wijnbergen (1985) to allow for endogenous exploration investment and carbon taxation. This model is as in van der Meijden et al. (2015) , but uses duality to permit a convenient interpretation of the comparative statics and an analytical evaluation of welfare and optimal climate policy.
The model consists of two countries: an oil-exporting country, Oilrabia, and an oilimporting country, Industria. There is an international market for a homogenous final good which is only produced in Industria, an international bonds market, and an 2 From now on we refer to 'oil' as shorthand for gas, coal and other components of fossil fuel. international market for oil. All markets operate under perfect competition. The stock of oil reserves and cumulative carbon emissions are endogenous, since initial reserves depend on initial investment in oil exploration. The only variable production factor in Industria is oil; other factors (e.g., land, labour or capital) are fixed. Preferences are homothetic and the same for Industria and Oilrabia. There are no bonds at the start and none left at the end. The market does not internalize climate externalities, but a carbon tax (or emissions market) can. There are no other market failures or distorting taxes.
Industria
Industria's preferences are defined by the concave unit expenditure function ( 
Oilrabia
Oilrabia chooses initial oil exploration investment J to maximize the present value of its profits or its national income, **
where S denotes initial oil reserves. We suppose diminishing returns from oil exploration, so that '( ) 0 SJ and "( ) 0. SJ  We thus get the familiar Hotelling rule, 
Equilibrium and Welfare
Perfect international capital markets imply that the interest rate is the same in Industria and Oilrabia ( * rr  and *   ). Equilibrium on the international oil market requires
The markets for present and future final goods must be in equilibrium too. Walras's law implies that it suffices that the ratio of future to current demand, ( ), r  equals the ratio of future to current supply of final goods:
(2)
We suppose that global welfare  is utilitarian and additive in private welfare and the green welfare loss ,  where the latter is the present value of cumulative carbon emissions:
 
Here 01   is the ecological discount factor including the effect of growth in damages.
Utilitarian welfare implies zero inequality aversion across the two countries.
Comparative Statics and Welfare Effects
We first solve the oil market equilibrium condition (1) for p 1 in terms of r,  1 and  2 , then solve the final goods market equilibrium (2) for r in terms of p 1 and  1 , and then combine the two by solving for p 1 and r in general equilibrium. All other variables then follow.
Partial Equilibrium in the Oil Market: Tax Incidence and the Green Paradox
Total differentiation of the condition for equilibrium in the world oil market (1) yields:
(4) 
A future carbon tax is partially shifted to oil producers too, so the world producer price of oil falls via the Hotelling logic both in the future and today. The future consumer price of oil will increase, so future oil demand falls. Current oil demand rises on account of the fall in the current oil price. Current carbon emissions thus rise and global warming accelerates, which is the weak Green Paradox effect. The expression for G  implies that the effect on the current oil price is large if price elasticities of current oil demand and supply are small relative to that of future oil demand (at zero taxes 2 2 1 1 2 2 0 / ( )  ), the weak Green Paradox effect is small. From (4) we note that a higher world interest rate depresses the consumer oil price and thus speeds up oil extraction.
Partial Equilibrium in the World Market for Final Goods
Total differentiation of (2) yields (5)
Intuitively, for a given p 1 , a higher current carbon tax curbs current relative to future production of final goods. The price of future final goods  thus has to fall to shift demand for final goods from the present to the future and restore equilibrium on world markets for final good and bonds. This corresponds to a rise in the world interest rate. A higher price of oil, given 1 ,  has the same effects and also requires a higher interest rate to restore equilibrium in world markets for final goods.
General Equilibrium Comparative Statics
Combining (4) and (5), we obtain the general equilibrium comparative statics: ( )0 and 0.
If evaluated at zero carbon taxes, we readily find that IS    and thus 1 0  and . II    We make the mild assumption that these inequalities hold in the range of carbon taxes that we will consider.
Comparing (6) and (4) With exogenous oil exploration and reserves ( 0 S   ), equations (6) and (7) simplify to:
The Green Paradox Revisited
Carbon taxation is unpopular, so we first consider the politically more palatable option of postponing carbon taxation and then that of taxing assets of oil producers and subsidizing renewable energy. We also show the effects of a carbon-intensive, cheap and abundant alternative (coal) to oil.
Postponed Carbon Taxation
It helps to distinguish three effects of an anticipated future carbon tax.
A. Weak Green Paradox effect: The future carbon tax depresses the current and future producer price of oil as some of the burden is shifted to oil exporters. This brings oil production and carbon emissions forward and accelerates global warming. As we have already seen, these weak Green Paradox effects are stronger if the price elasticity of oil supply is low and those of oil demand are high.
B. Intertemporal terms of trade effect: The relative fall in future supply of goods caused by the future carbon tax pushes up the future price of final goods (the intertemporal terms of trade) and unit expenditure e. The cut in the interest rate induces oil producers to produce less today and more tomorrow as it makes it in the margin less attractive to extract another barrel of oil. This attenuates the Green Paradox effect and thus mitigates the acceleration of global warming (comparing (6) and (7), we see that GG    ). 3 C. Putting out of business effect: The higher future carbon tax cuts the current and future producer prices of oil and thus curbs oil exploration investment, reserves and cumulative carbon emissions, especially if the price elasticity of oil exploration is high. In contrast to the weak Green Paradox effect, this curbs global warming and benefits green welfare.
Since the marginal change in private global welfare is zero at initial taxes,
the effect of a future carbon tax on global welfare is the same as that on green welfare:
Introduction of a global carbon tax thus improves global welfare if 11
Hence, the adverse weak Green Paradox effects are dominated by the beneficial effects of putting oil producers out of business and curbing cumulative carbon emissions if the price elasticity of current oil demand is low relative to that of oil exploration and oil supply and the ecological discount rate is low (high  ). If oil reserves and cumulative carbon emissions do not respond much to prices,
a future carbon tax harms global and green welfare. This is called a strong Green Paradox (Gerlagh, 2011) . But a strong Green Paradox does not mean that Industria's welfare ( * CC      ) needs to fall. This follows from the marginal change in Industria's welfare (
The first extra term reflects the import tariff benefits of a higher future tax. The second one reflects the boost to the intertemporal terms of trade (ITT = ) and the cost of utility, e, which erodes the real value of Oilrabia's wealth and boosts Industria's welfare. Since both these extra terms are positive, the gain in Industria's welfare unambiguously exceeds the gain in green welfare from the credible announcement of a future carbon tax. 
Merits of an Asset Holding Tax on Oil Producers
Sinn (2008) 
Such a tax increases the current price of oil and slows down current oil extraction and carbon emissions, hence has no adverse weak Green Paradox effects. But an asset holding tax also induces more oil exploration so that less fossil fuel is trapped in the earth and cumulative carbon emissions increase. At zero taxes, the effect of an asset holding tax on global and green welfare is the opposite of that of a future carbon tax: (2008) ), we establish that an asset holding tax is counter-productive whilst a future carbon boosts green welfare.
and also using * * * * 2 , CC   we find the effect of an unilateral asset holding tax on Industria's private welfare (evaluated at zero taxes):
It has been pointed out a long time ago that, with exogenous oil supply, 0 S   , an asset holding tax can decrease Industria's private welfare if the price elasticity of current oil demand is small and that of future oil demand is large (van Wijnbergen, 1985) . We can generalize this for
is large. This occurs if the price elasticities of current oil demand and oil supply are small and that of future oil demand is large.
Does Subsidizing Renewable Energy Induce Green Paradox Effects?
Subsidizing renewable energy can also lead to weak Green Paradox effects if renewables are perfect substitutes for fossil fuel and the switch to the carbon-free era is brought forward (e.g., van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012). To see how this works with imperfect substitution, let final goods production in period t be ( , ),
Renewable energy is a gross substitute for oil if the cross price
We thus see that a weak Green Paradox emerges (i.e., 1 p falls) only if renewable energy and fossil fuel are gross substitutes (i.e., 
Does Coal Reverse the Green Paradox?
Renewable energy is hardly used in the global economy. However, coal is abundant, cheap and still used a lot despite relatively strong adverse effects on global warming. We assume here that, in contrast to oil which is exhaustible, coal is in unlimited supply at a constant marginal cost and is an imperfect substitute for or a complement to oil. Denoting coal use with X t and the user cost of one unit by ,
The cross price elasticities of oil demand with respect to the cost of coal are in which case a future carbon tax boosts the current price of oil and cuts current carbon emissions (cf., Michielsen, 2014) . The boost to
Oilrabia's income at the expense of coal producers has been coined the Grey Paradox (Coulomb and Henriet, 2015) . 4 It occurs if the user cost of coal is relatively low compared with that of oil (low 22 / dq ), coal is much more carbon intensive than oil (high  ), the own price elasticity of oil demand is low, and the cross price of elasticity of oil with respect to coal is high. 
Effects of Introducing a Growing Carbon Tax
A balanced introduction of carbon taxes has the carbon tax growing at the rate of interest
this policy does not affect the intertemporal pattern of oil extraction, carbon emissions or welfare (see (8)). The burden of carbon taxes is thus fully borne by oil producers.
If the carbon taxes rise at a faster rate than the rate of interest or Hotelling rate (i.e., 21 (1 )
from (6) and (7). This boils down to 1 0 (4) . GI     The current consumer price of oil thus falls, current oil extraction rises and global welfare drops by
Hence, welfare worsens if the carbon tax rises too fast.
If oil supply does adjust (i.e., 0 S   ), then from (6)-(7) a balanced carbon tax hike gives
 (evaluated at zero initial taxes).
A balanced carbon tax hike thus boosts the current consumer oil price and curbs current oil extraction. It also curbs the current producer price of oil and thus curbs oil exploration and reserves as
Both the cut in current carbon emissions and the cut in cumulative carbon emissions boost green welfare. 
If oil supply is elastic, a balanced hike pushes up the current consumer price of oil as in (8) and curbs the current rate of oil extraction. It also depresses cumulative extraction and carbon emissions, and boosts green welfare.
Globally Optimal Carbon Taxation

First Best
The first-best global carbon taxes maximize global welfare  defined in (3) and may require lump-sum financed side payments. Private welfare of Industria falls and green welfare rises at the expense of Oilrabia, but global welfare rises compared with the nopolicy scenario. It follows that Industria can indeed compensate Oilrabia and both can be better off. The side payments ensure that it is feasible to implement a uniform carbon tax throughout the global economy, which is optimal from a global perspective. 
The first-best global carbon taxes ensure that this marginal change is zero. Since / 0, e      the first best displays no Green Paradox effects.
The first-best Pigouvian carbon taxes are higher if a lower ecological discount rate is used (higher value of ). They are also proportional to the marginal damage coefficient  and to the unit cost of real consumption e. 5 The current carbon tax is thus high if e is high and the world interest rate is low. However, the future carbon tax also responds directly to the rate of interest, so in general the future carbon tax is high if the world interest rate is high. 6 The carbon taxes are credibly set before the level of costly oil exploration is determined.
Hence, there is no incentive to burn less oil than has been explored. However, if it is optimal to fully exhaust a fixed and exogenous level of oil reserves ( (3), Propositions 1 and 3 are unaffected and the first-best carbon taxes in Proposition 3 become (11) and (12) with * ( ). CC
 
First-best carbon taxes are thus proportional to global wealth, * ( ), e C C  and rise in line with growth of the global economy (cf. Golosov et al., 2014) . 6 With power utility functions we have that / e  falls with  and rises with r (see Appendix B). subsidy, 2 (1 ) re     ). If it is not optimal to fully exhaust a fixed and exogenous level of reserves ( 12 R R S  ), the first-best taxes are determinate and given by (11) and (12).
Second Best
If for political reasons the current carbon tax is set too low, we show that the second-best optimal future carbon tax which respects this constraint is below the future Pigouvian carbon tax too. This credibly announced future carbon tax is designed to mitigate the adverse Green Paradox effects; the argument that the future carbon must be set higher than the Pigouvian tax to compensate for insufficient carbon taxation today is thus incorrect.
Proposition 5: If the current carbon tax is pegged too low, 1 1 1 , P     the second-best optimal future carbon tax given this constraint is set too low also:
The marginal change in global welfare (14) can be expressed as:
Note that this expression vanishes if carbon taxes are set at Pigouvian levels. Using (6) and (14), we get (15) from 0. d Recalling Propositions 1 and 3, a postponed or too rapidly rising carbon tax has adverse weak Green Paradox effects on short-run carbon emissions but beneficial welfare effects on curbing oil supply and cumulative emissions. The net effect on green welfare is negative if the price elasticity of oil demand is large and that of oil supply is small. In that case, the future carbon tax is also set rather more below the Pigouvian carbon tax to mitigate adverse weak Green Paradox effects, especially if the current carbon tax is fixed much below the Pigouvian tax. With fixed reserves ( S = 0) and a zero current carbon tax,
second-best optimal carbon tax avoids any weak Green Paradox effects. This is achieved with a future carbon subsidy ( 2 2 1 = / 0 SB P P      as in the first best). If the current carbon tax is pegged at a higher level or oil supply responds to prices, a future carbon tax may be needed.
Like credibly announced future carbon taxes, renewable subsidies accelerate global warming (see Section 4.2) but also lock up more fossil fuel and curb cumulative carbon emissions. One can also derive the optimal second-best carbon taxes if politicians prefer subsidies for carbon-free renewables to pricing carbon (over and above what might be necessary to internalize market failures in the production of renewables). The optimal second-best carbon taxes in the presence of such subsidies are then also set below what they would have been in the first best without these subsidies. as can be seen from (using (6) and (7)): welfare rises unambiguously if this tax is increased above the first best. But when raising the current carbon tax above the first best, the boost to Industria' welfare from putting
Unilaterally Optimal Carbon Taxation: Clobbering the Oil Barons
Oilrabia out of business is dampened by the negative intertemporal terms of trade effect.
We now show that the unilateral second-best optimal carbon taxes set by Industria consist of a Pigouvian part, a pure import tariff part, and positive and negative intertemporal terms of trade corrections for the future and current carbon tax, respectively. (11) and a specific import tariff, which consists of the two parts in the round brackets in (18) and (19).
A marginally higher future carbon tax curbs the current oil price (weak Green Paradox) which corresponds to a transfer of pure rents and boosts Industria's welfare at the expense of Oilrabia. This first part of the specific import tariff is the pure partial equilibrium import tariff 2 /, S p  (or the usual ad valorem import tariff 1/ S  ) and maximizes the capture of Oilrabia's Hotelling oil rents for a given interest rate (and consumer price of oil). This part of the tariff is high if the future oil price is high and Oilrabia cannot easily adjust its oil reserves downwards in response to a future carbon tax (low  S ). In accordance with the Ramsey principle of taxation, the unilateral carbon tax is pushed a lot above the first-best carbon tax if the price elasticities of oil exploration and oil reserves are small. With inelastic oil supply all rents will be captured.
Recalling the discussion of (16) If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is very large ( I  ), the ITT effects disappear and (18) and (19) If oil exploration is not very price sensitive (small S  ), the pure tariff will dominate the negative ITT effects of the future carbon tax and the current carbon tax will be set below the partial equilibrium level, especially if the Green Paradox effect is strong and intertemporal substitution weak:
The pure import tariff part is then large as it is easy to extract revenue. If the taxes become large enough, the carbon tax has to be set just below the level that creams off all oil rents. The unilateral second-best optimal carbon taxes harm global welfare but curb oil exploration and cumulative emissions more than the first-best taxes (provided the ITT effect of the current carbon tax is not too large). This indicates the conflicting interests of Industria and Oilrabia: oil exporters are put out of business by carbon taxes and import tariffs.
Finally, the unilateral second-best optimal policies (18) and (19) require pre-commitment to an announced path of carbon taxes but Industria has an incentive to renege and push up future carbon taxes even more once exploration investment has taken place. Once this investment has been sunk, all remaining oil rents are fixed in period 2 and Industria can tax them away by raising 2 R  to just under * 22 / CR as, once in period 2, Oilrabia must sell all remaining oil S  R 1 and taxes are non-distorting. This boosts Industria' welfare and curbs Oilrabia' welfare with green and global welfare unchanged. 7 7 Industria would tax away the rents in period one too, so Oilrabia does not invest in oil exploration at all. With recurring oil exploration investment (see Appendix A), no commitment leads to under-investment (cf. Fischer, 1980) except if reputation is built for not regening (Kreps and Wilson, 1982ab; Backus and Driffill, 1985ab) . Futures markets and storage also curb time inconsistency problems (Maskin and Newbery, 1990 ).
Extension: Oil-Importing Countries that Opt Out of Carbon Taxes
If some non-Kyoto oil-importing countries N do not price carbon, it is of interest to investigate the effects of unilateral carbon taxes by the Kyoto countries K on carbon leakage (cf. Pethig, 2011, 2013; Richter and Schopf, 2014; Sen, 2015) and to derive the unilateral second-best optimal carbon taxes to be set by the Kyoto countries K. 8 With identical, homothetic preferences for the three countries, equilibrium on the world markets for oil and final goods requires:
The solution for 1 and pr is (6)- (7),
where the new expressions for ,,
there is reversal of the Green Paradox effect (negative intertemporal carbon leakage). We focus at the case 0 D  which holds if effects are evaluated at a zero future tax ( 2 0   ).
Carbon Leakage and the Green Paradox
We see from (1) and (2) that a current carbon tax is partially shifted to Oilrabia (with constant elasticities and evaluated at zero taxes, we get 1 0 1 / ( ) 1
so that the current consumer price of price falls in N and rises in P. We thus have positive carbon leakage as emissions in N rise, both today and in the future. 9 A future unilateral 8 Non-participating countries do not levy a pure import tariff on oil. We focus at unilateral taxes and abstract from cooperative and non-cooperative setting of tariffs (cf., Bergstrom, 1982; Brander and Djajic, 1983) . Our analytical 2-period, 3-country general equilibrium analysis complements related empirical analysis (e.g., Elliott et al., 2010; Elliot et al., 2012; Fischer and Salant, 2013; Elliott and Fullerton, 2014) and numerical infinite-horizon analysis (e.g., Ryszka and Withagen, 2015) . A typical estimate is that 20% of carbon reductions in P leaks away due to higher emissions in N (e.g., Elliott, et al., 2010) . Simulations with numerical general equilibrium models show that, differentiating emission taxes by manipulating the terms of trade yields only small efficiency gains ((Böhringer et al., 2014a) and with OPEC as the dominant producer, leakage through the oil market can become negative (Böhringer et al., 2014b) . 9 If there is an internationally mobile clean factor that is in fixed supply and P and N goods are imperfect substitutes but factor substitution is strong, negative carbon leakage can occur (Baylis et al, 2014; Elliott and Fullerton, 2014) , since the taxed region substitutes away from fossil fuel to the clean factor, so that the other region shrinks as less of the clean factor is available. Interestingly, for all cases with negative carbon leakage, a unilateral carbon tax results in a welfare loss; however, with positive carbon leakage a unilateral tax can boost welfare (Baylis et al., 2013) . Negative carbon leakage can also occur if, as a result of a carbon tax in P, N becomes richer and thus pursues a more stringent climate policy (Copeland and Taylor, 2005). carbon tax is also partially shifted to Oilrabia ( () ( ) .
The first term in square brackets indicates the effect on green welfare. The second term indicates the rent-grabbing effect of a lower producer oil price on K's welfare at the expense of Oilrabia's welfare (N's welfare also increases). The third term results from the ITT effect of the induced lower interest rate and higher unit cost of utility on Industria's welfare at the expense of Oilrabia's and N's welfare. This term is proportional to K's future trade balance, so that is positive if K has a future trade surplus and negative if K has a future trade deficit. The tariff component thus makes a future carbon tax more attractive 10 Equation (20) 
Second Best: Global Altruism
If all oil-importing countries participate in Kyoto and price carbon, the globally first-best optimal carbon taxes are uniform and given by (11) 
, 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
, 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
.
The globally altruistic carbon taxes set by K are second best as N taxes carbon too low, hence they are lower than the first-best taxes. The current carbon tax is lower if more of its burden is shifted to oil producers (low I  ); the future carbon tax is lower if the weak Green Paradox effect is stronger (high G  ). From (21) and (22) we also expect the downward biases in globally altruistic carbon taxes to be bigger if the oil consumed by non-Kyoto countries is large relative to the oil consumed by Kyoto countries.
Unilateral Second-Best Optimal Carbon Taxation
From the perspective of the Kyoto countries, they can do better if they unilaterally maximize their own welfare as this allows them to levy a tariff to capture some of the rents of the oil-producing countries. The Kyoto countries' carbon taxes that maximize * ()
will be called the unilateral second-best optimal carbon taxes.
Abstracting from intertemporal terms of trade effects, these are (see (A20)-(A21) in Appendix D for the general equilibrium expressions):
, 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 11 1 1 1
These unilateral second-best carbon taxes exceed the globally altruistic taxes, especially if oil producers bear most of the burden (see (A22)-(A23) in Appendix D). This occurs if the tax incidence coefficient 1 I  is large and the weak Green Paradox effect G  is large.
The drop in welfare of oil producers and non-Kyoto countries is then larger. These taxes exceed the Pigouvian taxes if the rent-grabbing effects dominate the free-riding effects of N. The ITT effects for the future carbon tax would add positive terms to (23) and (24) and the ITT effects for the current tax a negative term to (23) (cf. Proposition 6). Countries may implement border tax adjustments to price carbon embedded in imports from non-Kyoto countries but general equilibrium changes in prices will blunt such second-best instruments (e.g., Lockwood and Whalley, 2010; Elliot et al., 2010) .
Strategic Behaviour
Our analysis can be extended to study strategic interactions. Consider a 3-country world with two symmetric oil-importing countries, say A and B, and an oil-exporting country. If
A and B set carbon taxes non-cooperatively, the Nash equilibrium with commitment follows from solving the current and future reaction functions (akin to (23)- (24)). This induces too low carbon taxes compared with the cooperative outcome, since climate externalities will not be fully internalized due to free-rider problems and rent-grabbing from oil producers will be less effective. To analyse such issues properly, one needs to allow for asymmetries in stages of economic development and asymmetries in the vulnerabilities to global warming damages of K and N to explain why some countries wish to implement lower carbon taxes than other countries.
One can also allow for strategic behaviour of oil producers. If they can exercise monopoly power on world markets, they will raise prices to capture some of the climate rents of oil importers just like oil importers cream off part of the Hotelling rents of oil exporters. 11
One might conjecture that this limits the scope for rent-grabbing and externality-correcting carbon taxes, so the carbon taxes will be attenuated. 12
Concluding remarks
There may be political imperatives to postponing current carbon taxation. But fossil fuel extraction and carbon emissions are brought forward as a result of introducing a future carbon tax, especially so if a relatively large part of the burden of the tax is borne by fossil fuel producers. Such weak Green Paradox effects harm green welfare. Its effects are attenuated by the lower interest rate which results from a higher intertemporal terms of trade necessary to restore equilibrium on the markets for final goods. This attenuation of the weak Green Paradox is more prominent if intertemporal substitution is weak. Such a future carbon tax also means that the oil barons are put out of business as more of fossil fuel reserves are left abandoned, so cumulative carbon emissions are less. A strong Green Paradox (a fall in green welfare) occurs if the price elasticity of the supply of fossil fuel reserves is small relative to that of fossil fuel demand and the ecological discount rate is high. Even with a strong Green Paradox effect, welfare of oil-importing countries can rise due to the import tariff and intertemporal terms of trade benefits of a future carbon tax.
An asset holding tax has the opposite effects on green welfare as an anticipated carbon tax. If oil supply does not respond much to oil prices compared to oil demand and the ecological discount rate is large, the short-run rise in oil use and carbon emissions (weak Green Paradox) of an anticipated carbon tax dominate the effects of curbing cumulative carbon emissions and green welfare falls (strong Green Paradox). An asset tax then curbs current emissions and boosts green welfare despite higher cumulative emissions.
Conversely, if oil supply is much more responsive to oil prices than oil demand and the ecological discount rate is small, the positive welfare effect of an anticipated carbon tax via lower cumulative emissions dominates the adverse effect of higher short-run
emissions. An asset holding tax then depresses green welfare (no strong Green Paradox).
We also show that a weak Green Paradox emerges if, instead of pricing carbon, renewable energy is subsidized and is a gross substitute for fossil fuel. If renewable energy and oil are gross complements, subsidizing renewables decelerates global warming. Coal which is abundant and cheap but much more carbon intensive than oil amplifies the weak Green Paradox if it is a gross complement to oil, but attenuates or even reverses it if it is a gross substitute. Reversal of the weak Green Paradox effect implies a boost to the current price of oil and the national income of oil-exporting countries at the expense of coal producers.
It occurs if coal is relatively cheap but dirty, the own price elasticity of oil demand is low, and the cross price of elasticity of oil with respect to coal is high. Hence, if the carbon tax hits coal much more than oil, the oil barons can benefit if oil substitutes a lot for coal.
A carbon tax that grows at the same rate as the world rate of interest does not affect the intertemporal pattern of fossil fuel extraction if fossil fuel reserves are fixed. Faster rising carbon taxes then give rise to Green Paradox effects and harm green welfare; slower rising carbon taxes boost green welfare. If fossil fuel exploration and reserves respond to prices, even a balanced carbon tax hike depresses cumulative emissions and boosts green welfare.
The first-best global carbon taxes equal the Pigouvian taxes: the present value of marginal climate damages. They rise slower than the rate of interest and do not generate a weak Green Paradox. If the current carbon tax is set below the Pigouvian tax, the second-best optimal future carbon tax is not set above the Pigouvian carbon tax to compensate for a too low current carbon tax. It must be set below the Pigouvian carbon tax to mitigate adverse weak Green Paradox effects, especially if the price elasticity of current oil demand is large and of oil supply is small.
Unilateral second-best optimal carbon taxes exceed the first-best taxes as they include an import tariff component, which is designed to capture part of the Hotelling rents and thus put the fossil fuel barons out of business. This import tariff component is bigger if exploration investments are not very sensitive to fossil fuel prices. The future unilateral second-best optimal carbon tax rises by more than the unilaterally optimal current carbon tax relative to the first best due to opposing intertemporal terms of trade effects. Unilateral The globally altruistic current and future optimal carbon taxes are set below the first-best taxes, especially if oil producers bear a lot of the burden and the weak Green Paradox effect is strong. Ignoring intertemporal terms of trade effects, the unilateral second-best optimal carbon taxes exceed the globally altruistic taxes, but they are set above the Pigouvian taxes if the rent-grabbing effects are stronger than the free-riding effects resulting from non-Kyoto countries pricing carbon too low.
An open question is why some countries do not pursue climate policy. Although poorer countries might a less ambitious climate policy and specialize more in pollution-intensive goods (Copeland and Taylor, 1994) , 13 political obstacles also differ across countries.
Focusing on national commitments to a uniform global carbon price instead of emission cuts might help (Nordhaus, 2013; Weitzman, 2014) . Second-best public finance issues also need to be taken more seriously. For example, without lump-sum finance globally optimal carbon taxes are 8-30 percent lower than without distorting capital taxes (Barrage, 2014) . Without commitment and with distorting capital taxes, unilateral optimal carbon taxes are too low from a global perspective (Schmitt, 2014) . Strategic interactions also need further study. From a policy perspective it is crucial that more understanding is gained on how to convince countries to stop using coal. More must be done to understand the obstacles that must be removed (such as fossil fuel subsidies) to get the world economy to use less coal (e.g., Collier and Venables, 2014) . Finally, more must be done on games resulting from oil importers investing in renewables and oil exporters using limit pricing to keep these alternatives out (e.g., Jaakkola, 2015) . 
The first-best optimal carbon taxes (11)- (12) 
The unilaterally optimal carbon taxes follow from maximizing * () dC  : 
The optimality conditions for the unilateral carbon taxes are: The first terms in the square brackets correspond to the damage to Oilrabia net of the gain to the non-participating countries of a drop in the real price of oil cause by higher carbon taxes. The second terms in the square brackets correspond to the positive and negative intertemporal terms of trade effects of the current and future carbon tax, respectively.
Since at zero taxes * ( ) 0, The first-best and globally altruistic carbon taxes From (A16) we see that with zero non-participating countries, all countries across the globe set the same carbon taxes and thus the first-best optimal carbon taxes equal the Pigouvian taxes. With non-Kyoto countries setting non-zero carbon taxes too, the marginal change in global welfare is (A17) and that the Kyoto countries set their carbon taxes in a second-best optimal fashion. We first consider the situation where the Kyoto countries are globally altruistic and maximize global welfare . Using 2 1 1 , 1, 2, , ,
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The unilateral second-best optimal carbon taxes We use (A15) and K's first-order conditions to get the unilateral second-best optimal taxes that maximize * ( ),
including the import tariff and ITT terms, from: 
